Dr. Gerold Yonas
Chief Scientist and Acting Deputy Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, U.S. Department of Defense

FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1986

I'm sure you know that the president of the United States loves the SDI and calls it the Strategic Defense Initiative. I'm sure you also know that the premier of the Soviet Union loves to hate the SDI and loves to call it the Star Wars program.

Ambassador Paul Nitze, who advises the president, is influencing our entire arms control negotiation process to pursue drastic reductions in offensive weapons and to enter into a "jointly managed transition" with the Soviet Union to make a shift from the present deterrence basis, which is based on threat of retaliation and increasing reliance on protection.

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has stated that although they had a research program, they shut it down because it was just a vision that did not work, and we ought to shut down our entire research program.

The Soviets not only have a large, ongoing strategic research program, but they have the world's only operational ballistic missile defense system in Moscow, and it's being upgraded. And they are building a large radar in Siberia as part of a nationwide system -- radar is a violation of the ABM treaty.

Long-term, Short-range

I have rejected the notion of "taking the technologies off the shelf and pursuing some kind of deployment. Instead, we are advocating a prudent research program in full compliance with the Ballistic Missile Defense treaty.

I and my colleagues have been emphasizing the importance of not just defense against long-range missiles, but also short-range missiles which have high precision, fast reaction times, and threaten our several hundred thousand troops in Europe and our command posts and airfields.

The Soviets are claiming that we should not only pull our nuclear weapons out of Europe, but we ought not even to pursue a defense against short-range missiles -- even though they are developing their own SAX 12.

The Real Issue

Our arms control team in Geneva believes that the very fact that we have an SDI research program has been a strong motivation in bringing the Soviets back to the table. But the Soviets claim that so long as we are carrying out the research, they won't enter into meaningful discussions. This controversy is distracting -- it defocuses the real issue.

The real issue is that we do not have a defense today against ballistic missiles. We chose to pursue this kind of vulnerability based on the theory that we were vulnerable and the Soviets were vulnerable. Thus, the very fact that we could threaten retaliation would be sufficient deterrence to prevent anyone from launching a first strike. This is a good strategy. But, apparently the Soviet Union hasn't accepted it.

The Soviet strategy has two components: the ability to launch a counterforce -- a preemptive strike -- to prevent us from retaliating and to have defenses to protect them from any kind of retaliation. They have accepted the importance of a combination of offense and defense to limit damage to their country, whereas we have based our strategy on the threat of retaliation.

A Better Strategy

Wouldn't it be better if both sides accepted increased reliance on defense and then used that defense so both sides could begin to negotiate offensive arms limitations?

The president did not tell us to go ahead with a deployment program -- or even a development program -- because he realized that such a program would have marginal utility. In many cases the needed technologies weren't there. What the president really asked for was a plan and then a research technology program to provide the basis for an informed decision.

In the process of carrying out the research we've chosen three criteria that we use in making decisions about what technologies to move forward with, what technologies to accelerate, and what technologies to put on the back burner. These criteria are survivability, robustness, and cost effectiveness.

Today we have the ability to retaliate. If at some time in the future you had elements of a defensive system that would encourage an attack because they could be easily defeated, then that lack of survivability would be a source of crisis instability.

The second issue is what I call "robustness." Defenses have to have growth potential so that as the countermeasures come in, the defenses can expand. Not that we will expand them, but we have to convince the Soviet Union that we're not entering into a dead end — that if they come in with countermeasures, we'll be able to modify and expand our system and stay ahead of them.

The third point is the question of cost effectiveness. If we are going to make a positive decision to move forward, we are going to have to see that our defenses can grow with a marginal cost that is less than the cost of the countermeasures.

If it succeeds, it will motivate the Soviet Union in their own self-interest to also move forward with defenses and to move away from further investments in offense.

The Architecture of Defense

In looking at the architectures of a defense system we have to have some overarching framework to balance these technologies. To understand how they play with one another we have to understand the relationships between the various component parts, and then balance those architectures against the Red Team architectures.

The architectural analysis includes not just the long-range missiles that threaten the U.S. We also carry out architectural analysis of the short-range missiles and what it means for our allies.

An example of an architecture for an effective defense against long-range missiles would involve sensors in space at high altitude -- probably at geosynchronous orbit-- sensors at lower altitudes, battle management computers, communications links between the various sensor elements, additional sensors on the ground, radars, and possibly sensors on board aircraft. This sensor suite would then provide information to interceptors.

These interceptors could be-speed-of-light weapons at middle altitudes, they could involve kinetic energy weapons such as small rockets with homing projectiles at lower altitudes, or rockets based on the ground to intercept in space.

An example of a countermeasure to overwhelm this Blue architecture would be to take the boosters, which now exist, and replace them with entirely new boosters that burn out so fast that it would be difficult to attack and destroy them. But when you look at the full architecture for the offense and see what is actually required to carry it out, you find there are penalties in terms of cost, performance, and time.

Sensors and Surveillance

The lynchpin, the driving factor, of the entire technology program is surveillance -- collecting and analyzing the data. If you look at the surveillance program, you'll find

many programs that have been underway for a long time, even before the SDI came into place. And you'll find many vital technologies that could play an important role-- not just in ballistic missile defense, but also in conventional defense -- and might even have some civilian spinoffs.

It involves space-based sensors, air-based sensors, and sensors on the ground. In fact,

if you look at our budget for the next five years, the combinations of sensors, systems, and battle management, without any interceptors at all, would probably be about half our program.

That's not the entire job. If you can find a booster, a post-boost vehicle, or a reentry vehicle, the next issue is how do you intercept it.

Hitting Bullets With Bullets

The most straightforward and best proven approach to interception of a high velocity object in space is with a very smart homing projectile -- essentially a space version of an advanced conventional munition.

These technologies are based on compact eyes, compact sensors, tiny computers, and miniaturized compulsion systems. Our goal is to compete the silicon chip with the plutonium warhead. All it takes to destroy a reentry vehicle moving at 5 kilometers per second is co run into a silicon chip; the energy released in that collision will destroy the warhead. That's the kind of technology we're pursuing.

Speed-of-Light Weapons

Speed-of-light weapons get more publicity than kinetic energy weapons. In the case of the kinetic energy weapon, you can fire the projectile and forget it. But speed-of-light weapons have to be pointed very precisely in order to be effective, and the pointing job is difficult. But if you can do it, you can deliver a lethal blow at the speed of light which makes it very difficult to carry out various kinds of countermeasures.

One application of speed-of-light technology, at lower powers than would be required to destroy reentry vehicles, would be to use this energy as a probe to sweep across a region filled with many confusing objects and probe them. If they are real -- if they contain heavy material -- they squeak. If they are there just to confuse us, we can use our interceptors to defeat the objects that are really threatening us.

Supporting Technologies

In addition to sensors, battle management, kinetic energy interceptors, and speed-of-light weapons, there is a very large array of critical supporting technologies that could make or break the program.

In fact, if you look at the program in terms of its technology base, about half of our budget is going into a wide range of supporting technologies -- advanced computers, advanced software engineering techniques, material science, new ways to transport material into space at low cost, very compact, efficient power supplies, and new electronic technologies for sensor development and manufacturing.

I think we are making progress in the important elements of the program -- the eyes, brains, transportation, and material science. I am confident that we can do what the president asked us to do -- provide the basis for an informed decision.

Answers to Written Questions from the Floor:

Q. A recent issue of Technology states that the USSR already has an operational ABM system. Please comment on these reports.

A. The Soviets have an operational system defending Moscow and are in the process of upgrading that system to new interceptors and new radars. One particularly disturbing element of their program is the very large radar under construction in Siberia that would complete the nationwide requirements for an early warning control system.

Q. The processing and software requirements of SDI have been described as insurmountable. How critical is software development to the SDI architecture?

A. Software is an important problem. We'll probably need to find ways to create a very large software system, the nature of which will be flexibility, expandability, and testability. We're beginning at the outset of the program to develop a national test facility that will allow us to bring together elements of the software as they evolve, integrate them with elements of hardware, and build the program hardware and software up together.

Q. Some opponents claim vociferously that SDI is an offensive weapons system being sold under the guise of a defensive system. Can it be converted into an offensive system?

A. There is no SDI system -- there is an SDI research and technology program. It is hard to say how some of these technologies could be applied. These are not weapons of mass destruction -- they are computer chips that can neither harm a city, nor reenter the Earth's atmosphere.

Q. Is arms control ever considered part of strategic defense?

A. Our goal is to provide a situation where both sides can be safer and more secure. We believe that arms control will play an important role in that process.

Q. Can you address the assertion that a competent defense against nuclear weapons makes the world "safe for conventional war?"

A. Clearly, if we're to make a transition to less reliance on threat of retaliation we're going to have to strengthen conventional defense.

Q. Has the "Star Wars" appellation damaged or aided the effort to convince the U.S. public that the Strategic Defense Initiative is desirable?

A. The name "Star Wars" is probably the most damaging thing that has ever happened to the program. It conveys the wrong impression, and has been an important tool for Soviet disinformation. I understand that the term Strategic Defense Initiative does not roll off the tongue. On the other hand, the program itself, the requirements of the program, and the underlying nature does not lend itself to simple answers or descriptions. This nickname gives an entirely wrong impression of what we are trying to do.

Q. How widespread and disruptive is opposition to university-conducted, defense-related classified contract work, such as the University of California's Livermore and Los Alamos operations?

A. Freedom of speech means they have the right to speak out, and academic freedom and that if they choose not to work on the program they have the right not to work on it. We would only be disturbed if they tried to infringe on the rights of others who are working on the program, which hasn't happened.

Q. What impact has the space shuttle mishap had on management and engineering practices at SDIO?

A. The SDI is a research and technology program. It is not a system development program, a system integration program, and is certainly not an operational program. The kinds of issues that are being confronted now in the shuttle tragedy have not affected the SDI.

Q. What do you anticipate the total cost of an SDI system would be?

A. Estimating costs of this hypothetical system would be a wild guess at this time. The purpose of the research is to get the answer.