The Honorable
Caspar S. Weinberger
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER l6, 1988

The world is a different place than it was 40 years ago at the dawn of the nuclear age. The strategic environment has changed. We understand better how to keep the peace. We understand the dynamic -- not static -- requirements of nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence no longer has to mean mutual assured destruction: the curious idea that if both sides were completely vulnerable and had no defenses, each was then perfectly safe -- that is the idea embodied in the ABM treaty. We have found a better way -- a mix of offensive and defensive forces, an opportunity created by our Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The Soviets have been working for at least 17 years to get strategic defenses. They also violated the ABM treaty by constructing the early warning radar at Krasnoyarsk. Now they are trying to use this violation to force us to agree to abide for 10 years to an interpretation of the ABM treaty which blocks any effective work on our SDI, while their scientists are trying desperately to deploy their SDI first.

We have the opportunity now to shape our strategic destiny. We have made great progress on SDI since we began in 1983. But we must have the political courage and the funding to move ahead. We must not let the Soviet agenda succeed. That agenda is for us to remain bound by the ABM treaty, which prevents deployment of SDI, while the Soviets race ahead with their own system.

Soviet Upset

The ABM treaty was based upon at least two assumptions which were not borne out: First, that there would soon be deep reductions in offensive weapons; and second, that both parties would give up defenses (except for one specifically permitted narrow and basically not very effective system).

The Soviets upset both assumptions. They never stopped their buildup and modernization of strategic nuclear offensive arms, and they never abandoned defensive strategies. In fact, immediately after signing the ABM treaty they began working to develop the same strategic defenses they so violently object to when we pursue them. They also deployed, and then modernized, all of the defensive systems permitted under the ABM treaty, and they violated that treaty itself by constructing the huge radar system at Krasnoyarsk.

The preamble to the ABM treaty states as its underlying premise: "That effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms." Moreover, both parties declared "Their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament and general, and complete disarmament."

Decade of Neglect

As the text of the ABM treaty suggests, the important issue -- real reductions in strategic offensive arms -- was put off to some future date, but we virtually gave up defenses by signing the treaty. That was perhaps the gravest error the United States has made over the past two decades.

Another serious misjudgment was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's belief that the Soviet Union would be satisfied with the concept of deterrence based on parity once they achieved nuclear equality with the U.S. The decade of neglect -- the 1970s -- when our investment in defense declined 20 percent, had its roots in these errors of judgment. This was the decade when we neglected, to the point of danger, to modernize adequately our strategic offensive forces. This was also the decade when the Soviets made the greatest increases in their military structure. These misjudgments have cost America dearly.

Not only have the Soviets greatly expanded their nuclear arsenal but, almost from the day the ABM treaty was signed, they have been working intensively to secure strategic defenses for themselves, including work on advanced defensive technologies. This experience points to specific lessons we should have learned about arms control, nuclear weapons, and what constitutes stability.

Straw Man

Critics of SDI have created a "straw man" argument. They say that a perfect defense cannot exist, therefore SDI is a waste of technical and financial resources. But the value of SDI must be viewed in phases.

A first SDI phase will offer an important element of protection for all the West. It will, for example, provide significant protections from strikes from the Soviet Union and other countries. Additionally, the first phase of SDI could protect us by offering us the opportunity to shoot down some of an aggressor's ballistic missile force, and thus add to our deterrent capabilities, and reduce the possibility that the Soviets would launch an attack in the first place. By deploying SDI, we greatly omplicate the calculations of Soviet planners weighing the costs of an attack.

Above all, SDI opens the way to deep reductions in offensive nuclear weapons with a margin of safety. That opportunity could be lost if we continue to carry out the Soviet agenda for us of giving up nuclear weapons too soon, or adhering to a flawed, violated treaty which bans our deployment of SDI while the Soviets are free to pursue theirs, as they have, and as they will.

Also if we have defenses in place, the Soviets have less incentive to cheat on arms reduction agreements. If the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to destroy a portion of their ballistic missiles as they deploy defensive systems, they would be sending each other signals that neither side was seeking a strategic advantage.

Progress

We must recognize two things: We have made enormous progress on SDI, and we are not alone in pursuing strategic defense.

The USSR is deeply involved in its own strategic defense initiative and has been for nearly two decades. The Soviets are doing advanced work on laser weapons. They have already constructed several ground-based lasers capable of damaging our satellites. Overall, the Soviet Union has spent $150 billion on all forms of strategic defense in the last 10 years, while purporting to adhere to the anti-ballistic missile treaty and loudly decrying any effort we make to acquire defenses against their missiles. In contrast, in 1987 the U.S. spent $3.6 billion on SDI, slightly more than 1 percent of the U.S. defense budget. Congress cut this back even further this year, while simultaneously adding crippling restraints on our work on SDI.

Technological developments making SDI possible will continue to move forward. The only question is whether the United States will have the will and the clarity of vision necessary to give us the security SDI brings.

Answers to Written Questions from the Floor:

Q. Please comment on the recently released book Landslide, and its allegations that President Reagan was so despondent after the Iran-Contra scandal that an aide considered invoking the 25th Amendment.

A. That is total and utter nonsense and almost the silliest thing I've ever heard. I was with the president virtually every day during that period. I doubt if the authors of that book ever saw the president. I think they yielded to the blandishments of literary agents and others who tell you that the only way to sell a book is to get some headline material into it. The president was in perfectly good condition during all of that time. He obviously was disappointed that parts of the policy that he hoped would work were not working, but we all have disappointments.

Q. What was your position on the Iran-contra deal?

A. I opposed the whole transaction. The president was given bad advice by some very naive people.

Q. How are we to pay for the $1 trillion strategic defense system? Would taxes have to be raised?

A. Taxes wouldn't have to be raised. It will cost far less than to continually upgrade, modernize, and strengthen the existing offensive systems to keep pace with the Russians, particularly when we don't have any defenses and no real way of guarding against cheating by the Soviet Union. The costs could be added on an annual basis in increments that would easily be met in the defense budget. Raising taxes is not a way to deal with the deficit. The president's requests for defense spending from 1982 to 1987 were cut $125 billion. In the same five-year period, his requests for domestic spending were increased by $250 billion, and that's where your deficit comes from. If you raise taxes domestic spending would increase. The money would not be used to reduce the deficit. We could easily fit strategic defense research into a defense budget. By doing this we could reduce some of the costs of offensive systems -- which we would have to do anyway.

Q. What proof do we have that the Soviets are working on an SDI?

A. We have their acknowledgement of it. Recently they put out statements saying that we should stop because they were working a system that would not only give them SDI, but would be able to destroy ours.

Q. What is the greatest technical challenge in deploying SDI?

A. Improving and adding to the computational capabilities. We also will need back-up systems because this is not a field in which you want to take very many risks.

Q. What defense, if any, would SDI offer against chemical or biological weapons?

A. It's not designed for that. It won't end war and it's not a panacea. It is designed to destroy long-range and intermediate range nuclear weapons before they get near any of their targets.

Q. Considering the magnitude of the SDI program, how can we prevent the fraud and mismanagement that has plagued defense procurement activities?

A. We ought to first get the facts. In an organization where 52,000 contracts are signed every single day, one or two things may go wrong, no matter how good you are or how hard you try. If a person is dishonest or violates his trust, he should be punished immediately. The system as presently constituted will be sufficient to insure that the appropriated funds are wisely and effectively used. There's no way to guarantee that over 3 million people are going to be completely honest. But we have a system in place that does assure us that the great bulk of what is appropriated will be honestly and properly spent for what is incontestably the most important purpose we can devise.

Q. Is the Soviet, Eastern European empire beginning to break up? If so, what should we do while it is happening?

A. The Soviets are not going to allow their Warsaw Pact allies to fall very far away from them. It's important that we try to be of as much assistance as we can to groups within those countries that are striving for their own freedom.

Q. How can NATO overcome Soviet superiority in conventional arms?

A. We have to protect our rapidly eroding technological edge. We're losing a lot of it to theft by the Soviets, we're losing a lot of it by the unwise sale of technology to Eastern Bloc countries. Modernization and conventional weapons are much more expensive than nuclear weapons. That means larger expenditures are required, and a great many people in free democratic societies simply don't like to spend money on defense or weapons systems.

Q. Would you accept a position in Vice President Bush's cabinet?

A. No.