LT. GEN. G.V. UNDERWOOD, JR.,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Defense Command

Friday, August 14, 1970

“Safeguard Anti-ballistic Missile Project is actually a life insurance program Americans at a time when their country faces a potential threat to its existence that is clearly without precedent and almost beyond comprehension. Failure to take out the minimum essential amount of life insurance could turn out to be, at worst, a fatal miscalculation, and at best, a mistake placing the nation in what Secretary of Defense Laird has called, ‘a second-rate strategic position.’

The need for Safeguard arises from an impressive buildup of Soviet offensive missile forces that, if continued at current rates, could achieve for the Soviet Union a position of superiority in land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and in submarine-based ballistic missiles (SLBMs) by 1975.

To appreciate the significance of such a fundamental shift in the international power balance, one need only ask how a future Cuban missile crisis would be resolved with the United States in an inferior position offensively and in a naked condition defensively.

Defensive Weapon System

The President has asked the Congress for authority and funds to add a third site and to perform advance preparation work on five other sites. This action is rational in that it increases the survivability of Minuteman, the prime target endangered by the Soviet buildup of offensive missiles.

This action is non-provocative because it is entirely defensive in scope and content. This action is timely in that it recognizes that we must start now, if we are to have the needed minimum defense of our retaliatory forces by the time the Soviet missile threat can reach menacing portions in the mid-70s.

I am puzzled by those who oppose the deployment of Safeguard on the grounds that it is a provocative act. Safeguard is a purely defensive weapons system centered on the protection of our retaliatory forces and not our cities.

Actually, it is the offense which causes missiles to impact on another country. It is the offense which makes the enemy bleed. An ABM defense has no such capabilities and hence should be regarded as an inherently stabilizing factor.

There are three ways to cope with the continuing, dramatic buildup of Soviet offensive missile forces. The first course is to do nothing, to gamble our security on the hope that the Soviets will not continue the buildup or will never make use of their expanded power. This would be unrealistic and irresponsible, particularly for those charged with the Nation's security.

The second is to deploy more offensive missiles instead of building a defense. We think there is a better way to preserve our deterrent power.

The third is to build and deploy Safeguard at a rate governed by the developing intelligence, technological, and diplomatic situations. This the minimum prudent response to the rapidly increasing Soviet threat to our retaliatory forces.

Major Safeguard Components

The Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) is the long-range phased array sensor for the system. The structure is 130' high, 200' long, 200' wide, and hardened to withstand considerable blast pressure. PAR sites will have either one or two faces. Each PAR face will provide 120° of radar coverage.

The PAR will detect the target, verify that it is a warhead, track it and predict the impact point. The PAR can detect a target out to a range well beyond 1,000 nautical miles.

The other Safeguard radar is the Missile Site Radar, or MSR. It also is a phased-array radar with four faces, each providing about 90° coverage. It is a five-story structure with three stories underground and it is also hardened. It is 120' x 120' with 40' above ground.

It can detect and track the target with great precision at a range of several hundred miles. The MSR also guides the defensive missiles (Sprint and Spartan) to points where they can intercept the incoming warhead. This radar also discriminates between the incoming warhead and any accompanying decoys.

The long-range interceptor of the Safeguard system is the Spartan missile, a three-stage supersonic vehicle capable of intercepting targets in outer space.

The Spartan is big—55' long. It carries a large warhead in the megaton range to a distance of several hundred miles— that is, well into outer space. The warhead has an impressive lethal radius. When it bursts, it disables the incoming warhead—that is, the nuclear warhead on the ICBM or SLBM does not detonate. Because the Spartan has such a long range, a single site can protect an area of about 600 x 900 miles.

A Modified Spartan missile is under development which features a smaller warhead and much greater velocity. These special capabilities enable Safeguard to cope more effectively with SLBMs and depressed trajectory ICBMs. The Modified Spartan should be available for deployment in 1976.

Accidental Missile Launch

Basic Spartan gives us a missile with a large warhead for use in making long-range intercepts in outer space. Modified Spartan gives us a fast missile with a smaller warhead for use in making long-range intercepts within the earth's atmosphere. We need both types because they perform different functions.

First and foremost, Safeguard will protect our land-based retaliatory forces --that is, our Minuteman missiles and SAC bombers--against a direct attack by Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs.

Secondly, we will provide an area defense for the country as a whole against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within this decade.

Finally, we can protect the United States against an accidental launch from any source.

The Soviet Union has been steadily increasing its submarine-launched missile force. This means they are acquiring a capability of launching missiles from Polaris-type submarines on a depressed trajectory that might reach our SAC bases in less time than it takes our bomber alert force to take off.

Many Americans apparently believe we already have an active defense against ballistic missiles. We do not. We can warn of impending attack -- but we have no capability to knock down an incoming ICBM or SLBM.

About one year ago the Red Chinese were busily engaged in rebuilding their ICBM launch sites. Their thermonuclear test program was moving along very quickly and they had actually detonated a 3-megaton warhead that was small enough to be delivered by an ICBM.

Red Chinese Threat

Today, the Red Chinese test site appears to be virtually finished. On this basis, a test firing of an ICBM is possible within the current year.

Moreover, the Chinese are considered capable of developing by the mid-1970s an ICBM force which, in the absence of an ABM defense, could kill from 10 to 20 million Americans.

The first phase of the project calls for just two sites, one in North Dakota and one in Montana, to protect our northern-most Minuteman sites. These two sites will be completed in 1975.

Phase II of the project calls for a maximum of 12 sites deployed all around the country in a pattern dictated largely by the location of our Minuteman fields and our Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber bases.

Heavy Loss of Life

The best way to defend people is to defend the credibility of our deterrent forces. In the present state of the art it is not possible to provide an airtight defense for our cities. Even if we provided a heavy defense for our major cities, some ICBMs would eventually penetrate that defense and cause heavy loss of life.

However, we do not need a perfect defense in order to have an effective defense of our retaliatory forces. In this case our objective is to insure the survival of the minimum number of Minutemen and bombers required to demolish the main targets in the Soviet Union. And we want this capability to be unmistakably clear.

By defending our missiles and bombers we make our deterrent more positive and more credible and a nuclear war less likely. That is why we put primary emphasis on defending our retaliatory forces.

We are confident that the Safeguard will work for the special purposes we have in mind. This confidence is based upon many years of research and development work on anti-ballistic missiles, starting with the Nike Zeus. Our confidence also reflects encouraging results from extensive testing of the Spartan and Sprint missiles, the MSR and the data processor.

Will Safeguard Work?

The Safeguard is as safe as the best designers and engineers can make it. It is certainly as safe as the nuclear weapons now in our inventory and we have had no accidental explosions in the 20 years we have been operating nuclear weapons. The weapon is so designed that the chances of an accidental launch or explosion are virtually nil. In order to launch or detonate the missile, a series of specific, deliberate, confirmed actions must take place with the result that the chances of an accident are as close to zero as humans can get.

History indicates that U.S. action on the anti-ballistic missile has not affected the SALT talks adversely. In 1967--four days after the Congress approved Sentinel--the Soviets expressed an interest in the SALT talks. Then last November, shortly after the Senate authorized Phase I of Safeguard, the Russians agreed to discuss procedural aspects of the SALT talks at Helsinki.

The record also shows that the Soviets see no inconsistency between continuing their missile projects while expressing an interest in these arms limitation talks. Since the SALT talks began in Helsinki last November, and then this summer in Vienna, the Russians have test-fired more than twice as many strategic missiles as the United States. The Soviets also have carried on a vigorous ABM development program, including tests of improved, long-range anti-ballistic missiles.

Since the first two installations will not be operational until 1975, there would seem to be plenty of time for the two countries to explore the possibilities of negotiating agreements to limit strategic weapons.

Having three different offensive capabilities, Minuteman, Polaris and bombers, gives us flexibility and reliability which are highly desirable. We want more than one arrow in our quiver. Besides, this variety of offensive weapons forces the Soviets to allocate to defensive programs resources that would otherwise be available to put into offensive systems. Then, too, with three types of offensive weapons, we have a guard against technological surprise, should the defense make a technological breakthrough in any one area.

The Russians have actually produced and deployed one ABM system and have undoubtedly gained valuable operating experience. Nevertheless, we have been conducting a very vigorous and comprehensive research and development program for many years now.”

Answers to Written Questions from Floor:

Q: What ultimate dollar cost for constructing ABM system?

A: No man can anticipate the future costs. However, phase one first of two sites estimated cost $2.1 billion does not include cost to AEC for warheads. Current estimate of cost of Phase II approximately $10.3 billion.

Q: Why not rely on nuclear subs?

A: Believe that at this time we have approximately 1,050 Minutemen, 500 bombers, 650 Polaris. Believe it wrong to rely on a single weapon system. This way we have three ways of guarding ourselves. It's sound to have flexibility.