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  Where are the Russians on SDI?

Dr. Edward Teller
Physicist; Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1986

We are living in a time when surprise is following surprise in every field. Due to technology our hopes about the future can be much greater - and our fears, correspondingly, more ominous. What will happen, of course no one knows, but I am sure of one thing: Mankind will survive.

The one thing we cannot do in today's world is remain ignorant. Not to work on the possibilities of strategic defense means to remain ignorant.

All of you have heard that Moscow is defended by 100 reloadable launchers. How effectively they will defend Moscow and what more than Moscow can they defend, we don't know.

I have some information from Arkady Shevchenko who visited the Lawrence Livermore Lab recently. In 1978 he was a high official in the UN, representing the Soviet Union. Shortly afterward, he defected. Shevchenko told us Soviet estimates in 1978 were that Moscow's defense could shoot down more than half of the missiles that came to attack Moscow. Furthermore, the Moscow system would be upgraded, and after that, they estimated it would able to shoot down more than 90 percent of incoming missiles. The Moscow defense was upgraded. Our retaliatory missiles were not.

Monopoly on Defense
Under the ABM Treaty the Soviets have every right to defend Moscow with precisely 100 launchers -- which are, we believe, reloadable.

We not only have abided by the ABM Treaty, we have not even put up 100 launchers anywhere, to defend anything. This is a serious omission on our part. Just as the Soviets have every right to defend themselves, we have every right to defend ourselves.

The Soviets are protesting SDI because they have a monopoly on defense, and intend to keep it. Why half of the politician in the free world agree with the Soviets that we should not defend ourselves is beyond me.

The Soviets have developed a surface to air missile -- SA-12. This missile is mobile. They are about to deploy it. In a few years they will have hundreds of them -- maybe 1000 or 2000 -- maybe more. The Soviets claim these missiles are there to defend against incoming airplanes.

What counts in such a defense is acceleration -- how quickly the missile can turn. That acceleration, published in reliable British sources, is "at least 10 times the acceleration that any pilot can stand." I estimate that with appropriate available equipment, these surface to air missiles could stop any incoming ballistic missile --particularly ours.

Our ballistic missiles carry few if any decoys. Our retaliatory missiles do not as yet have the capability, nor are we seriously working on the capability to make them take a more complicated path to reach their predetermined target. We don't even try any evasive action, yet we see the development of very real Soviet defenses.

Radar and Laser Beams
The Soviet radar station in Krasnoyarsk has been completed. That radar will show how our missiles approach. The information can be handed out to the SA-12s, which will make a good defense after retaliatory missiles have reentered the atmosphere.

We are approaching the point where mutually assured destruction is not only a terrible idea, but it won't even work. We are allowing our forces of retaliation to become obsolete.

The Soviets have worked for at least 10 years on lasers -- high intensity lasers which can be directed so accurately that in 1000 miles, the spread of the beam will be no more than five feet. We have seen at least one published deployment of such lasers in the Soviet Union on the military test site of Shari Shagan on the shores of Lake Baikal. I suspect that this is not the only one. We act as though the ABM Treaty were a reality.

Civil Defense
A dozen years ago, we studied in detail Soviet civil defenses in a number of cities. If we believe those cities are typical and extrapolate the amount of building they have done in the meantime, then according to these unproved assumptions, the Soviets now have good shelters for most of their city population.

Whether this extrapolation is right or not, I do not know. The CIA has either neglected its duty to find out, or has found out -- but not told us. Plans to protect millions of people cannot be considered secret information. We should know, and we have a right to know. We have done practically nothing about civil defense.

The name of our very important enterprise is a misnomer. It should be called SDR -- Strategic Defense Response. We are trying to repeat what the Soviets have done.

Space Deployment
Space deployment is a possibility we cannot completely neglect, but it is not something on which I would count. The words "Star Wars" were never used by the president or anyone connected to him. It was first used by Ted Kennedy an hour after the president's speech on March 23, 1983. The Soviet answer by Secretary Andropov was pitched against this imaginary possibility. In reality, if you try to deploy defenses in space, they will probably be seen by the Soviets.

I would like to put simple objects into space. I would like to have ways to launch them -- ways less expensive than what it would cost the other side to disable them. These are objectives which can be approached. Terminal defense -- defense after the missiles have reentered -- is another possibility that is likewise, quite real.

Reagan's Offer
There is one innovation, one extremely important step taken by our president which has been given little attention in this long and poisonous debate over SDI: his proposal that in the end we should share whatever we accomplish -- even with the Soviets. He offered cooperation with the Soviets, and they would have none of it. Of course not -- they are years ahead of us. They have nothing to learn from us at this stage.

The president did something else: He offered cooperation to all our friends and allies. Arrangements have been made and are proceeding with the British, West Germans, the Israelis, and Italians. Something has been signed also with the Japanese, but not with the French. What do you expect? The French are logical. They will sign when we prove with certainty that defense is necessary. Perhaps the successor to the president of France will have enough logic.

Stop-Gap Measures
The Soviets have one great asset -- they have the most powerful military. We are trying co catch up in defense. If we do, and can dissuade them from further expansion, then changes in the Soviet Union will become necessary.

If there is no defensive power to match their offensive and defensive power, we shall be in very deep trouble. I would like to conclude with a somewhat detailed suggestion.

I want arrangements with the Swiss. Switzerland has not neglected civil defense. Switzerland need not worry about a full-scale attack being launched against them, it need worry only about some missiles that might have lost their aim and come toward Switzerland. Their active defense, as we see it does not yet show anything like complete defense against a massive attack. As of today, their defense would be good enough against an accidental firing, a mistake, which is all the Swiss need.

That is what we need as a first step toward the everlasting goal of maintaining peace. We will not have assurance of anything as long as we are alive. But we can't make the catastrophe of war less and less likely if we develop real defenses.

President Reagan's great contribution was to acknowledge publicly that defense is not just for the United States, but for everybody. When we begin to develop civil defense and active defense, jointly, we can make the threat of war less effective and therefore less likely. This is the most important goal we can pursue.

Answers to Written Questions From the Floor:

Q. If the Russians have always been much more concerned about the defense of their country than about developing an offensive system, why have our leaders concentrated primarily on developing an offensive weapon system? Do you see this changing?

A. The Soviets have not concentrated on defense in preference to offense. A book published a year and a half ago entitled History Teaches a Lesson, clearly says chat military preparation is necessary both in an offensive and defensive sense. That is the doctrine the Soviets have been following. What have we been doing? Up to 1945, we believed we were invulnerable. The atomic bomb has changed that. When the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb in 1949, our first correct reaction was to look after our air defenses. Then came the missile threat; it became clear that defense was more difficult than just defense against aircraft -- and we gave up. A man who has a strange name, Robert "Strange" McNamara, announced the possibility, the probability, the certainty -- the bookkeeping certainty -- that the only defense is retaliation. We gave up even air defenses. That foolish, morally wrong, mistaken policy was maintained up to March 23, 1986 when Reagan asked: "Isn't it better to save lives than to avenge them?" This obvious truth is now questioned by many people.

Q. Gorbachev recently said he does not fear SDI because the Soviets have found a way to counterract it. Please comment.

A. Gorbachev deals in understatements. They have already counteracted it.

Q. Does SDI involve putting nuclear devices in orbit?

A. It might. I do not believe it is necessary. But if you want to defend yourself, you should use every reasonable way. Let us say, for instance, a 10-ton nuclear bomb explodes over our heads three miles up. We would hardly notice it -- no fallout under it because all the radioactivity will go up into the stratosphere. Such devices should not be left out of consideration. When you think about a difficult problem like defense, you should not by limited by preconceived notions.

Q. Since laser intensity weakens with distance, isn't SDI impractical due to its tremendous power requirements?

A. Laser intensity weakens as the beam spreads. In 1000 miles the beam need only spread five feet or less. This means that lasers may be used over very big distances.

Q. How realistic is it to discuss civil defense when we are talking about nuclear weapons?

A. Civil defense is remarkably effective. An inexpensive shelter will protect the people inside against any explosion unless the explosion is within a mile or closer.

Q. What is your response to scientists who claim SDI is impossible, or too expensive?

A. Recently, members of the Academy of Science were asked this question. Most of them sent in answers not very favorable to SDI. Some of them wrote remarks -- none of them wrote any technical argument. I will give you an answer written by somebody who declared himself against SDI: "It would take me months of study to form an informed opinion on the more quantitative aspects of the SDI project you ask about. At this point, I have mere suspicions about what the answers would be. I would not wish to be quoted on them...I am very concerned about the financial aspects of the program at a time of a grossly inbalanced budget. In view of the economy, nothing else matters. There won't be much left to defend. Also the drain of both manpower and funds from other areas may well be excessive." The Congress has voted little more than 1 percent of our military spending for SDI. Is that excessive? Much less than 1 percent of our academic manpower is participating.

Q. What or who is the most reliable source of information about Soviet progress on SDI?

A. The CIA, and they won't speak.

Q. What is Gorbachev's role in Soviet SDI decision-making?

A. Gorbachev is a splendid salesman and the only liar who manages to lie better than Hitler.

Q. Can mutual inspection be equitably effective?

A. I would like agreements that can be checked -- like announcing the firing of rockets six hours in advance. Since rocket firings can be seen, such an agreement could be checked.

Q. Would you support SDI on the basis that if it's successful in the U.S., we give the technology to the Soviet Union?

A. I am supporting SDI on the basis that we need it, the French need it, the Israelis need it -- and the Soviets already have it.

Q. It is now three decades since the short-lived Hungarian revolution against Soviet domination. Is your native land still closely controlled by the USSR, or are ties looser today?

A. I have been at the sad celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Hungarian revolt -- in Washington, in Pittsburgh, in Chicago. You no longer see Russian soldiers in Hungary. They are there, but you can't see them. They are kept away from the people. Also, it seems the Soviets have allowed more not-quite-Communist activities to the Hungarians than to their other subjects. But colonialism remains colonialism. Hungary was and is a Russian colony. And I am very sorry, but I am not for liberating any colonies, not even Hungary. I do not want TO DO anything that may lead to war. But we should know, and the Soviets should know that if they start a war, they have already 100 million subjects outside the borders of the Soviet Union -- 100 million Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians who have reason to hate them. They know this, and that knowledge may help to ensure peace for the world.

Q. Why attempt SDI when the Russians can put nuclear devices on ships and dock these ships in American ports?

A. The possibility of individual nuclear explosions cannot be eliminated. An unsuccessful attempt of nuclear attack against the United States would bring about terrible consequences, specifically to the Soviet Union -- that the Soviets know. I am not proposing to abandon retaliatory powers. I am proposing not to put further emphasis on them -- to put our main emphasis on the obvious possibility of attack. In addition, I should recommend every reasonable method to stop individual explosions. The greatest danger is from terrorists, and that danger is best countered by efforts in the United States which have been undertaken, and by an international effort which is still lacking.

Q. I have just returned from the Soviet Union, and the people are very concerned about the escalation bankrupting their economy by funneling funds to the military rather than to consumer goods. I am concerned about the same dismal outcome of SDI for our economy. What about the economic consequences?

A. Military work may bankrupt the Soviet Union, but I believe that the military work will continue even if we don't defend ourselves. If we don't defend ourselves, a strong defense in the Soviet Union will put them in an excellent position to demand from the rest of the world whatever they want.



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