Abba Eban |
November 14, 1970
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Abba Eban
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Israel; Israel's first Ambassador at the UN; Author, My People: The Story of the Jews
Answers to Written Questions from the Floor:
Q: Why did it take Israel so long to win the Six Day War?
A: With all respect, when I see what other people have been doing with their wars, this is one question that should not be asked about.
Q: In your opinion, what vital interests of the United States warrant our continued support of Israel?
A: Well, of course it's for the United States to define what its vital interests are. And, in point of fact, it has defined the preservation of Israel's security and sovereignty as one of its vital interests. This has been defined as a vital American interest in a bipartisan spirit under various administrations, never with such emphasis as the recent definitions of it. Now, all of us maintain the very intricate research organizations to find out what are the motives of Soviet policy; and we always base ourselves on the assumption that although we, like you, as democratic societies, are full of indiscipline and anarchy and subjective impressions, the Soviet Union always acts in cold and logical calculation. Well, perhaps they are human as well.
I think their objectives are as follows: no peace and no war. No war because war would involve the necessity for them to support the United Arab Republic. If the Egyptians were to start a war again, they would not do very well. They would suffer far more than they would inflict, and the Soviet Union would either have to leave them to their fate or come to their rescue. If it came to their rescue, it would bring into question the American-Middle Eastern commitment. The Soviets are not looking for global confrontation; therefore they do not want war. But this doesn't mean to say that they want peace. They want a situation intermediate between war and peace, because if there was peace there would be no need for that Soviet presence, which, tragically, is based almost exclusively on military penetration. The Soviet presence in the Middle East is a military presence. The Arab-Israel conflict has been so valuable to them that if it didn't exist, they would probably try to invent it.
It has given them a base in Egypt, Algeria, Syria; it has brought their submarines and vessels into the Mediterranean, now also into the Indian Ocean. It has enabled them to outflank the European defense system from the South. It has enabled them to play upon the fears and the complexes of the Arab world to create an anti-western atmosphere. These are the results of a situation which I would call one of controlled tension.
Therefore, to get peace, one of two things must happen: either we must transcend the Soviet Union by an Arab-Israel agreement, or we must hope for a radical change in the whole atmosphere of American-Soviet relations, so that they would not see themselves in terms of competition, but of cooperation. But let us be realistic. Today, they are, in terms of competition, they are trying to undermine every American interest in the world. The arena in which that campaign is undertaken is no longer primarily Europe, where you have built a strong fortress, or Southeast Asia, where they have the fear of China. The Middle East and the Mediterranean is now the area in which the Soviet Union is trying to change the international equilibrium to its advantage; and I think that a farsighted American statesmanship would diagnose this situation.
I believe it has diagnosed it. I've heard of the authoritative statement that was made before your Commonwealth Club by an American official charged with this question a week or so ago, and if you remember, this was stated that there is a disharmony between Soviet and American policies towards Israel, because the Soviet Union has an anti-American objective in its Mediterranean policy.
Q: Why is England so uncommitted to Israel?
A: I don't believe the British people feels uncommitted to Israel, because in the anguish of 1967 there was hardly any country in which the surge of opinion was so intense. Nor do I think it's correct to say that Britain is uncommitted to Israel. The fact is - it may be a tragic fact - that Britain is becoming uncommitted to the human race as a whole. After a period of universal commitment, there is now a mood of disengagement, especially from the area east of Suez. This was frankly stated a few years ago not to have any interests or responsibilities east of Suez, but to draw into the consolidation of the national economy, and to look for a European vocation. I think that is the complex now, and since there is no British strength in the area, the sense of responsibility is less and the sense of caution is far greater.
It may be that the transition from a universal responsibility to a complete disengagement has been made too sharply. I think most observers and critics would say that that is the case. But whether we like it or not, that is the situation. I don't remember in history any such swift transition from a sense of universal vocation and mission, to a withdrawal into one's self. They had an election campaign in June in which not a single foreign interest was ever mentioned; in which there was no vision of the world or of society; but in which the entire preoccupation was with economic reconstruction. I think that is basically at the root of the American solitude.
One talks of four great powers, but let us be perfectly frank: there are not four powers of equal strength and influence. It may not be pleasant to hear this, but there are two powers; there is a polarization in international strength, and the responsibility of the defense of the free world and its economic consolidation now rests almost as exclusively in the United States as does the leadership of the Communist world in the Soviet Union. As the countries of Western Europe achieve greater affluence and stability, it would, I think, be legitimate to ask them to resume a part of the burden and responsibility for the defense of common western interests.
Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, the next question relates to a statement made before The Commonwealth Club by an American representative - I think you just referred to him a moment ago - who appeared last week, and he made the statement that Israel had also violated the cease-fire agreement by its in-flights over the 50-mile demilitarized zone. I wonder if you'd comment on that.
A: Well, I think the key word is "also," because I know that Mr. Sisco and his chiefs, President Nixon and Secretary Rogers, have said that the basic violation is by the United Arab Republic bringing up this massive missile system.
Now, if an agreement is violated it cannot be binding on the other side, and the least that we can do is to go over and have a look, to know whether it is being violated or not. Now, that the United States is not much in a position to quarrel with this is proved by the following fact: that the United States government has said in the United Nations that we, the United States, have independent evidence of Egyptian violations, and your delegation was prepared to show maps and photographs to other delegations about the violation of the other side. Well, how were these photographs taken, by remote control?
I presume, in fact it is known, that there has been American reconnaissance as well, which is part of the rules of the modern game, but certainly it is not aggressive to find out whether your neighbor is keeping his agreement or not. But the fact is, we're ready for a bargain. Let them take the missiles away and we'll see that our planes do not hover over them. The position tonight is that their missiles are there, and our aircraft are not there.
Q: What is His Excellency's personal reaction to the coup which took place in Syria yesterday, and has Israel taken a position on this event? How does this coup alter the Mid-East situation?
A: Well, every week that passes in Syria without a coup evokes our astonishment. There is the tragedy of instability in Syria, which more than in any other Arab state. Under the Ottoman Empire it was the most turbulent province. The French, who had the control of Syria under the mandate, had a word for it - "ungouvernable" - ungovernable, and that, I think, is the modern experience.
I do not feel that the recent change has very much effect, because it is not a change of regime, it is a change of personal power within the same ruling group. This is the Baath group, dogmatic, intransigent, isolated, vehement in its refusal to have any dialogue with Israel, isolated even from the rest of the Arab world, so eccentric in its policies that even the Soviet Union finds it impossible to follow the degree of extremism to which they have gone, an ideology much more influenced by the Chinese revolutionary ideology than by the relatively more conservative Soviet Communism (if that isn't a contradiction in terms).
That is Syria - military control, no experience at any time of a democratic process. The only way to change a government is by death or forcible deposition. I don't believe there has been a single case of a change of government by a normal, peaceful process in Syria during the past 20 or 30 years. I don't believe that this is a massive or a crucial event, because the new leader, General Assad, who took over the day before yesterday (if he is still the leader today) is a part of the same group as President Atassi and Assad and Zuayyin, the isolationist, communist indoctrination which has removed them from the mainstream of Middle Eastern life. They don't even accept the Jarring Mission or the Security Council Resolution, because these are based on Israel's existence, which they do not recognize. Therefore, I don't believe that Syria is going to be the focus to watch.
The places to watch are, in relation to Israel, Cairo and Jordan. Cairo, because it is still the center of the Arab world, inspite of the diminished resonance of the Egyptian voice through the transition from the previous leadership to a much less charismatic and influential leadership. Nevertheless, by its weight and population and central position, the UAR is really the leader of the Arab world, and if it were to break through to peace, the others would follow. That's one center to watch. The other one is the Israel-Jordan sector, because the territories and populations which are really involved, in what I would describe as the "War of the Palestine Succession" - the two peoples of the former Palestine area, on both sides of the Jordan, live in Israel or in Jordan, and that is why the major problems would find their discussion and solution in the Israel-Jordan context.
Now, we would begin with Jordan tomorrow if necessary, because Jordan has not brought up missiles, and there isn't this problem of confidence; there is no request for rectification; and I've let it be known to Ambassador Jarring that if he were to convene us, we could begin the dialogue with Jordan immediately. It may be that Jordan would not be willing to begin unless accompanied by the senior Arab state.
How to break down the obstacles to a negotiation with the UAR is something that our government and your government are discussing separately and jointly. As of this moment, the obstacles have not yet been overcome. In any case, I think Syria will be the last to make peace, just as Syria was the first to make war. It was the last to sign the armistice; I think it will be the last to make peace and it will then only do it under the compulsion of other Arab action. History teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted all the other alternatives. I think that applies here.
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